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ABSTRACT
The present study, a replication and extension of
Schoeneman (1981), investigated college students* reports
of the sources of self-knowledge as a function of a per
ceptual focusing-salience hypothesis.

Self-awareness

manipulations (exposure to a video camera, a mirror, or
a no stimulus control condition) were used in an attempt
to change the perceptual salience of the sources, hence
changing subjects’ self-reports, to test the hypothesis
that subjects were responding because of the perceptual
salience or availability of sources.

Across all three

conditions half the subjects completed personally worded
questionnaires and half completed impersonally worded ones
in order to see if questionnaire wording would interact
with the salience manipulations.

Examination of a second

hypothesis, that the self-focusing attention manipula
tions would support Buss'

(1980) self-consciousness

theory and not Duval and Wicklund's (1972) theory of ob
jective self-awareness, was attempted.

Subjects used

self-descriptive adjectives and wrote short paragraphs
about how they learn things about themselves, which were
subsequently scored for mentions of self-observation,
feedback and social comparison.
vi

Subjects also ranked

the order of importance of these three sources for each
self-descriptor.
Results from this study replicated Schoeneman
(1981) quite closely.

Replication of a sex difference for

percent mentions of social comparison (males = 12.9%,
females = 6.1%, F (2,63) = 5.35, p < .025) was discussed
at length and several interpretations of this were
offered.

No significant and theoretically consistent dif

ferences were found between experimental conditions or
wording conditions.
supported.

Thus, the salience hypothesis was not

Because no differences were found between ex

perimental groups, it was not possible to test the Buss
and Duval and Wicklund theories.

The possibility that the

questionnaire produced a non-specific self-focus was
tested; however, this was not supported by the present
data.

Implications for future investigations, such as

possible questionnaire effects, improved self-awareness
inductions and alternate explanations for the sources of
self-knowledge phenomena were discussed.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
What kind of person am I?
information?

How do I find out this

These are two questions that people frequently

ask themselves.

Over the years, the answers and defini

tions that people have used have become the basis for an
interesting phenomenon which psychologists have termed
the implicit personality theory.
trigued researchers and theorists,

These issues have in
such as Heider, Jones

and Kelley, who have investigated individual's perceptions
of the causes of behavior, or "attributions."
Heider (1944, 1958) and Kelley (1967) characterized
the person as a naive psychologist and an intuitive stat
istician, respectively.

The focus of their investiga

tions indicated that people are often quite accurate in
their attributional statements of causality.

However, in

recent years many researchers have become interested in
another facet of attributional ability.

Instead of pri

marily focusing on attributional accuracy, researchers are
now beginning to study more about people's attributional
inaccuracy.

A notion first proposed by Heider, that be

havior will engulf the situational field, i.e., that
1
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people tend to overattribute the causes of behavior to per
sonal factors and not situations, has become very important
in recent statements of attributional error.

Jones and

Nisbett (1972) identified the "actor-observer difference":
actors tend to report their own behavior as due to situa
tional influences, while observers report the same be
havior as due to actors' dispositional traits.

Similarly,

Ross (1977) reiterated Heider's (1958) observation that
"behavior engulfs the field" when people make attributions
and labeled it the "fundamental attribution error."
These errors exemplify the growing interest in
attributional biases.

This area of research, where a per

son often fails to act as an accurate intuitive scientist
or statistician, provides a theoretical framework for an
investigation of peoples' implicit personality and at
tributional theories.

Two particularly interesting ques

tions that may be investigated are "How do people perceive
that they learn things about themselves?" and "Are these
perceptions based on any systematic attributional errors?"
In an exploratory study, Schoeneman (1981) classi
fied the sources of self-knowledge into three categories:
self-observation (Bern 1972), social feedback (Cooley 1902;
Mead 1934), and social comparison (Festinger 1954).
Studies using these three sources of self-knovMe<dge^-as__
response categories indicate that undergraduates (Schoene
man 1981) and children (Schoeneman, Tabor & Nash, Note 1)
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emphasize self-observation as the best way to find things
out about themselves, followed by feedback and social
comparison.

While these two studies do not indicate how

subjects actually find things out about themselves, they
do suggest a tendency, or perhaps a bias, to report these
sources in a rather consistent pattern.

These results

have prompted Schoeneman (1981) and Schoeneman et al.
(Note 1) to theorize a salience effect as responsible for
subjects' overwhelming choice of self-observation as the
best source of self-knowledge.
Thus, it may be that another instance of judgmental
error, reporting self-observation as more important because
of its salience, may be a function of one or more items
on the rapidly growing list of attributional biases (see
Ross 1977 and Nisbett & Ross 1980 for reviews of these
errors).

It is the hypothesis of this investigation that

selection of self-observation, social feedback or social
comparison may be accounted for by the relative perceptual
salience of these three sources; e.g., if information from
another person seems especially salient, social feedback
may be reported as the most important source of selfknowledge .
The present investigation essentially replicated
Schoeneman's 1981 study but also utilized self-awareness
inductions, such as exposure to mirrors and video cameras,
to test the; salience hypothesis.

Self-awareness inductions
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should change the perceptual salience for each source
(Taylor & Fiske 1978), resulting in differential citation
of each source as the best way to learn about oneself.
If these inductions are successful, it should also be pos
sible to examine two self-awareness theories that make
competing predictions (Buss 1980; Duval & Wicklund 1972).
Duval and Wicklund propose only one state of selffocused attention; objective self-awareness.

In a refine

ment of this theory, Buss (1980) differentiates selffocused attention into two distinct states; private selfawareness in which people are in touch with their private
thoughts, ideas and feelings, and public self-awareness in
which people are concerned with how others see them.
Duval and Wicklund (1972) predict that objective selfawareness may be induced by several means, such as exposure
to mirrors and video cameras, which are assumed to be
equally effective.

The Buss theory, however, predicts

that a mirror will induce private self-awareness and a
video camera will induce public self-awareness.

In the

course of this investigation it will be possible to make
predictions of the effects of experimentally induced
self-awareness from the theories of both Buss and Duval
and Wicklund.

Each of the two theories would predict a

different pattern of perceptual focusing and as such
would result in a different pattern of reporting of the
sources of self-knowledge.

The Duval and Wicklund posi

tion predicts no difference between mirror and video
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camera experimental conditions as both of these selffocusing stimuli direct attention toward the same selfawareness state.

Buss's theory, however, would predict

that public self-awareness, induced by exposure to a video
camera, would produce more attributions of feedback and
social comparison while private self-awareness, induced
by the mirror, would produce more self-observation attri
butions.
Before more specific predictions are to be made
however, it is appropriate to review some relevant litera
ture.

Following then, is a brief review of Schoeneman's

work with the sources of self-knowledge, attribution
theory leading up to Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) hypo
thesis of the availability heuristic, Taylor and Fiske's
(1978) work with perceptual focusing, and the selfawareness theories of Buss and Duval, and Wicklund.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Sources of Self-Knowledge
In a review of the social psychological literature,
Schoeneman (1981) isolated three broad categories of
theories which specify three self-validation strategies:
self-observation, social feedback and social comparison.
Self-observation, which may be seen as extensions of work
by authors such as Bern (1967, 1972) and Duval and Wicklund (1972), was defined as a condition where an indi
vidual is attending to thoughts, feelings and external
behaviors (Schoeneman 1981).

Social feedback, coming from

the symbolic interactionist tradition of Cooley (1902)
and Mead (1934), recently reviewed by Shrauger and
Schoeneman (1979), involves inferences and evaluation
of both implicit and explicit feedback from others.
The third source of self-validation, social comparison
(Festinger 1954), involves comparisons between an indi
vidual's and others' thoughts, feelings and external be
haviors (Schoeneman 1981).
After identifying these three methods of self
validation, Schoeneman investigated college students'
6
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perception of the relative importance of these three
methods.

His study used both interview and questionnaire

methods and yielded a consistent pattern of results; sub
jects overwhelmingly chose self-observation as the pre
ferred method of self-validation followed by social feed
back and social comparison.

In this study, number of

mentions of sources yielded ratios of approximately 7:2:1
(for self-observation:

social feedback:

social compari

son) , with rankings of importance ordered similarly.
Schoeneman, Tabor and Nash (Note 1), using children aged
four to eight, also found a similar set of results with
self-observation being selected as the "very best" source
of self-knowledge much more frequently than the other two
sources.
As mentioned earlier, the above results are not
taken as evidence that self-observation is the most fre
quent way that people find out about themselves.

Nisbett

and Wilson (1977) point out that subjects do not have
direct access to their cognitive processes, so it is not
clear whether they are somehow producing accurate intro
spective data.

Thus, these results indicate only that

subjects report self-observation as the most important
method of self-validation.
Attribution Theory
The question of whether an individual's attribu
tions and self-reports are accurate has a long history in

the field known as attribution theory.

Before discussing

possible attributional processes involved in reports of
the sources of self-knowledge, a selected review of at
tribution theories will be presented, starting with a review
of Heider, the founder of attribution theory, and followed
by a discussion of modifications and refinements of some
of Heider's ideas proposed by Jones and Davis and Kelley.
This section will end by discussing what Ross (1977) has
called "shortcomings of the intuitive psychologist."
Heider (1944, 1958) proposed that the average person
often acts like a "naive scientist" in trying to inter
pret cause and effect relationships.

Thus, the Heiderian

preceiver's role is to "discover the invariances which
underlie manifest actions in order to stabilize the en
vironment and render it more predictable"
1965, p. 222).

(Jones & Davis

The perceiver does this by attributing

behaviors to situational or dispositional causes.
As Heider terms it, perceivers make an "implicit
factor analysis"
of causality.

(1958, p. 297) to determine the locus

Just as in statistical factor analysis,

where numerical data yields information about relation
ships between items or events, in the implicit factor
analysis behavioral observations yield information about
relationships between situational and dispositional ef
fects and the behavior.

This information is sufficient

to allow the individual to make an attribution.

However,
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as Heider notes, "in many cases the attribution is dicated
by personal preferences, habits' of thought, or needs, and
results in distorted views" (Heider 1958, p. 297).

In this

short quote, we see part of the future of attribution
theory, i.e., a hint that man's attributions may be biased
by "habits of thought."
Heider (1958) discussed 10 variables people use in
their naive analysis of behavior; subjective environment
or life space; perceiving; experiencing or being affected
by; causing; can; trying; wanting; sentiments; belonging;
and ought or may.

These variables provide the "data" for

the perceiver to use in his or her factor analysis.

A

brief summary and short example of each of these concepts
may be found below, in Table 1.
Table 1
Heiderian Concepts

Subjective
environment

Awareness of the people and places in
our environment, e.g., we know that
the library is in the middle of campus
and in it we find books and helpful
librarians.

Perceiving

The method in which events enter our
subjective environment, e.g., we know
the library is in the middle of campus
because people have told us and we
have also seen it there.

Experiencing

This involves experiencing and being
affected by persons and impersonal
entities, e.g., in our deleaings with
the library I have experienced pleasant
librarians and have had to obey
library rules.

\ \
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Table 1.

Continued

Causing

Provides information about the cause of
events, e.g., the car that struck mine
in the parking lot was driven by some
one, it did not simply roll into my
car.

Can

Tells us whether a person or entity has
the ability to do something or is power
less and cannot do it, e.g., can some
one fly an airplane or can't they?

Trying

Tells us if an event was caused inten
tionally or unintentionally, e.g.,
they meant to hit my car in the park
ing lot or they slid on ice and hit my
car.

Wanting

Very similar to trying but typically
the goal is only wished for, e.g., they
wanted to hit my car but didn't dare
try.

Sentiments

Awareness that people and objects have
positive or negative balances, e.g., if
we note that one person likes another
then we also know these people are im
portant to each other.

Belonging

This involves people or objects forming
meaningful units, e.g., she is my wife,
this is my book.

Ought

This involves a relationship to a stan
dard, e.g, as a good student you should
study hard.

While Heider specified the basics of person percep
tion, a common criticism of his theory is that it lacks
integration of these basic components.

Schneider, Has-

torf and Ellsworth (1979) suggested that Heider's work
may not constitute a good theory since it has many

A\
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loopholes making empirical predictions difficult.

On a

similar point, Bern (1974) noted that Heider's statements
on person perception and attribution received little at
tention, compared to his more formal balance theory, until
Jones and Davis (1965) reformulated these statements into
more testable forms.
The Jones and Davis (1965) formulation known as
correspondent inference theory, is similar in many ways
to Heider's.

Like Heider, Jones and Davis say that people

try to reason out the causes of behavior based on the ob
servable effects.

The more specific focus of correspondent

inference theory is dispositional attributions of other's
behavior and Jones and Davis assume that the observer makes
attributions based on inferences of what the actor tried
to d o .
The term "correspondent inference" refers to the hy
pothesis that inferred dispositions may be directly re
flected in, or correspond to, observable behaviors.

The

information value of these inferences is a function of
non-common effects and out-of-role behavior.

This refers

to behavioral effects which may be unique to a given ac
tion or setting, e.g., if two possible choices differ on
only one dimension then we typically infer that choice of
either alternative is due to this single non-common
factor.

Suppose, for example, that an individual is in

the market for a sports car and is trying to decide between
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a Chevrolet Corvette and a Datsun 28OZ.

We can observe

both cars cost about the same, get nearly equal gas mile
age and are equally fast and comfortable.

The singular non

common effect is the country in which each is built so if
our individual buys the Corvette we can infer, from his
choice, that they prefer to buy American-made automobiles.
Social desirability also plays an important role in
the information value of non-common effects.

Within cor

respondent inference theory, socially desirable effects
are assumed to be the intended outcome of behavioral ac
tions.

However, as Schneider et al.

(1979) report,

socially desirable behaviors yield little information com
pared to the high information value of non-socially de
sirable actions.

If our individual, in their new sports

car, has a flat tire or mechanical trouble 5 miles down
the road and calls us for help, then there are two pos
sible outcomes; assisting them or refusing to assist them.
By going to help them, which is the socially desirable
choice, very little information is available concerning
our helping behavior, unless the mishap occurred 50 miles
away which indicates quite a bit about our helping be
havior.

Refusing to help our friend would tell much more

about our altruism, or lack of it.
In their 1965 paper, Jones and Davis discuss two
levels of relevance within correspondence inference
theory; hedonic relevance which is the motivational
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importance to the perceiver of the outcome, and personal
ism, which is a condition in which the perceiver feels that
he or she is the intended target of the outcomes.

These

conditions have received little attention since first pro
posed by Jones and Davis and as such do not seem to have
played a major role in attribution research stimulated by
their formulation.

Jones, discussing the significance of

correspondent inference theory, notes that it has been
most useful as a "logical template for detecting various
sources of bias and errors"

(1978, p. 333).

In addition to Jones and Davis's extension of Eeider's
concepts, Kelley (1967, 1972) has also provided reformula
tions of ideas first proposed by Heider.

Kelley's ap

proach to attributional processes seems to be quite dif
ferent from the Jones and Davis approach.

Correspondent

inference theory's focus is on determining a dispositional
cause for acts through examination of situational deter
minants.

Kelley's approaches, however, are typically con

cerned with examining how personal biases are ruled out
in favor of more "accurate" environmental entities and
data.
In contrast to Heider and Jones and Davis, Kelley
proposed two attribution models, the covariation model
(1967) and the causal schemata model (1972), each of which
attempts to describe attributional processes in a differ
ent setting.

The covariation model is typically used

when the information available includes several behavioral
observations of an individual over a prolonged time course
as well as data concerning how others would act in the
same situation.

In the circumstance where behavioral data

comes from only one observation, Kelley predicts that
people will use the causal schema model.
In the covariation model (Kelley 1967, 1973) man is
predicted to make attributions of causality by correctly
noting the covariation between behaviors over entities,
people and time.

This specifies three variables within the

covariation model which Kelley calls distinctiveness, con
sensus and consistency.

Distinctiveness refers to the

generalizability of behavior over different entities, e.g.,
"Does Louis like all cats or does he just like one special
cat?"

Consensus information provides a type of normative

data or generality across people.

An example of this would

be, "Do most people like cats or is Louis one of just a
few cat lovers?"

Consistency information provides data

about the behavior's reliability over a prolonged time
course.

Using the cat example, consistency information

tells us if Louis has always liked cats or if he just
likes them once in a while.
In a recent discussion of Kelley, Schneider et al.
(1979) note that he predicts that high level of consis
tency, distinctiveness and consensus should result in
attributions of external causality.

The combination of

high consistency with low distinctiveness and consensus
should result in internal or actor-produced attributions.
A test of these two predictions plus other combinations of
these three factors was done by McArthur (1972).

She

found general support for the covariation model; however,
consensus information was found to be the least important
of the three types.
The causal schema model differs substantially from
the covariation model in the way it conceptualizes attribu
tions being formed.

Kelley defined a causal schema as "an

assumed pattern of data in a complete analysis of variance
framework"

(1972, p. 152).

This matrix of data is thought

to be derived from daily experience in observing causes
and effects.

This data is called forth to supplement the

data provided by the single behavioral observation the perceiver has to use in forming his attributions.
Kelley proposes the existence of several basic types
of schema; multiple sufficient causes, multiple neces
sary causes and compensatory causes.

Multiple sufficient

causes refer to the situation when any one of a number of
causes is sufficient to produce the observed effect.

In

this case the external causes are often seen as strong
so only one of the multiple causes may produce the ef
fect, i.e., a student may plan to attend college to gain
parental approval, to pursue a field of study leading
to a high paying job, or to enjoy campus life with its
many parties and social events.
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With multiple necessary causes it is assumed that
all causes must be present to produce the effect.

In this

case the causes are often seen as being relatively weak
so all must be present to produce the effect; a student's
success in calculus or with a musical instrument is de
pendent on both ability and effort.

Undoubtedly many

able calculus students who did not have the effort to
study can attest to the logic of this schema.
While multiple sufficient and necessary causes deal
primarily with the presence or absence of causes, compen
satory schema deal with the degree of effects.

Kelley

(1972) cites compensatory schema as a method for producing
a Guttman Scalogram-like analysis of relationships between
causes.

For our hypothetical math student, more effort

may be required, to produce a satisfactory grade, if they
have less of an aptitude for math.

This allows a matrix

to be constructed for compensatory causes (Kelley 1972)
(see Table 2).
Table 2
Kelley's Compensatory Schema
Math Ability
High
Medium

Low
S

Study Effort
Medium

High

S

S

S

S

Low
S = where satisfactory grade is produced.

S
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The resulting ANOVA may become quite complex because these
basic schemas may be involved in numerous experimental de
signs.
The last area of attribution research to be reviewed
deals not with the theory of any one researcher, but with
the recent findings of man's attributional biases; e.g.,
proper, though erroneous, conclusions drawn from improper
premises or sources of information (Fischhoff 1976).

Two

processes involved in misattribution, perceptual focusing
and Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) concept of the avail
ability heuristic, will be discussed in considerable detail
due to the importance of these concepts in the present
study.
Perceptual Focusing and the Availability Heuristic
Taylor and Fiske (1978) reported that subjects
respond to the most salient stimulus in the perceptual
field, with very little conscious thought involved.

Quite

frequently, a stimulus is cited as causal in proportion
to its perceptual salience or its attention-getting
properties.

These effects seem to be such that a salient

social stimulus has more of an impact on an individual's
decisions than is justified given the actual situation.
Findings such as these have led Taylor, Crocker, Fiske,
Sprinzen and Winkler (1979) to speculate that salience
may be a perceptual bias, very similar in nature to
phenomena such as optical illusions or figural emphasis.
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Additionally, Taylor et al. propose that salience effects
are an automatic response to events and typically occur
without the individual's awareness or intention.
The general finding that salient events are attributed
as being more causal also seems to hold for self-perception
studies as well (Duval & Hensley 1976; Duval & Wicklund
1972, 1973; Wicklund 1975).

In their review, Duval and

Hensley (1976) note that self-attending individuals over
emphasize themselves as having a causal role on a number of
tasks.

Thus, it may be that Schoeneman's (1981) and

Schoeneman et al.1s (Note 1) subjects viewed self-observa
tion as more causal due to increased salience of the self
brought about by the introspective nature of thinking about
the sources of self-knowledge.

Indeed, Wicklund (1979)

notes that often subjects are quite compelled to view some
thing, the self in this case, as more salient simply be
cause it is the central topic of interest.

In the in

stance where a subject is asked how he or she finds things
out about himself or herself, attention is directed to
the self, making a causal self-attribution— i.e., a mention
of self-observation— quite likely.
Taylor and Fiske point out that once such a causal
attribution is made, an individual may find it very easy
to incorrectly validate the attribution using what Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) call the "availability heuristic" in
recall.

Tversky and Kahneman define the availability
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heuristic as the condition where "people assess the fre
quency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease
with which instances or occurrences can be brought to
mind"

(1974, p. 1127).

More specifically they report that

biased recall may result from any of the following four
factors:

the differential retrievability of examples, ef

ficiency of a memory search set, differential imaginability
of instances or illusory correlation.
Thus, the availability heuristic may alter subjects'
reports of how they learn things about themselves in sev
eral ways.

Those sources which are more complex, abstract,

or seem less desirable may be cited less often.
man et al.

Schoene-

(Note 1) indicate that social comparison was

more difficult for preschoolers to understand than self
observation and feedback, giving partial support to the
idea that social comparison is the most complex of the
three.

Thus, it may also be more difficult to comprehend

relative to the other possible sources for other subjects.
Using Tversky and Kahneman's terms, it may be harder to
retrieve and imagine making it less "available."

Also,

illusory correlations between sources of self-knowledge
and the perceived desirability of the sources may affect
the recall and report of these sources.

Schoeneman sug

gested that self-observation may fit in more with the
typically American notions of individuality, independence
and self-reliance, making this a more desirable method of
self-validation (Note 2).

Similarly, feedback or social

\ \
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comparison may be seen as less desirable sources of selfknowledge because of their reliance on others, making sub
jects hesitant to report them.
The availability heuristic may be conceptualized as
a component of perceptual salience serving two functions.
The availability of information related to a stimulus may
serve to increase the initial salience of a stimulus.

At

a later point, this heuristic may also serve an important
role in the validation process of an attribution.

Biased

recall has been shown experimentally to produce a firm
opinion, even based on information known to be incor
rect (Ross, Lepper & Hubbard 1975).

It is possible that

such a mechanism is at work when subjects are asked "What
is the best way to find something out about yourself?"
Instead of carefully reviewing all of their available
information, subjects may make a decision based on the
most salient, or available, information.

This decision

could then be incorrectly validated as accurate due to
the ease of retrieving earlier life events in agreement
with the initial attribution of causality (Taylor & Fiske
1978) .
A test of Schoeneman's hypothesis (1981) that dif
ferential perceptual salience was responsible for his pat
tern of results could be achieved by manipulating the sali
ence of these sources, which should result in an increase
in social comparison or feedback reports when the

XX
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manipulations make social comparison and feedback more sali
ent.

A possible method of achieving differential percep

tual salience of these three sources is to induce selfawareness states using self-focusing attention manipula
tions such as mirrors and video cameras (Buss 1980; Duval
& Wicklund 1972).
Theories of Self-Awareness
An apparent contradiction exists between the selfawareness theories of Buss (1980) and Duval and Wicklund
(1972).

While Buss's and Duval and Wicklund's theories

deal with self-awareness, they differ both in their state
ments of the nature of these states and in the experimental
manipulations to produce them.
In their original formulation of objective selfawareness, Duval and Wicklund (1972) proposed that atten
tion was focused either outward toward the environment,
a condition called subjective self-awareness, or inward
toward the self, a condition called objective selfawareness.

In this latter state, the one of interest in

this paper, the subject takes himself to be the object
of perception.

Objective self-awareness is then approxi

mately the same as self-focused attention (Wicklund 1975) .
In a recent paper, Wicklund (1979) noted four as
sumptions of objective self-awareness.

The first of

these assumptions is that at any given moment attention
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is either wholly directed toward the self or wholly di
rected away from the self.

Thus, increased objective self-

awareness merely means more time is spent with attention
being self-focused.

A second assumption is that if atten

tion is directed towards the self by an external stimulus,
i.e., directed to the face by a mirror, there is an increased
probability for any aspect of the self, not just the part
of the self to which attention was directed, to become the
object of attention.

The third assumption is directly re

lated to the second.

No matter how or where self-focused

attention begins, "attention will then gravitate towards
whatever feature of the self is most salient and not to
the entire self" (Wicklund 1979, p. 189).

The final assump

tion is that once attention is directed to an aspect of
the self, self-evaluation relevant to that aspect will
also begin.

Thus, the initial reactions to objective self-

awareness may be summarized as self-evaluation on whatever
dimension is most salient at the moment.
Wicklund reports that objective self-awareness may
be induced by any symbol of the self or any "stimulus
that reminds the person of his objective states" (Wick
lund 1975, p. 234).

More specifically, in his 1979 review

of self-awareness, Wicklund proposes that mirrors, tele
vision cameras, tape recordings of the subject's voice,
photographs of the subject, or the presence of an audience
will all be equally effective in producing a state of
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objective self-awareness.

For the sake of completeness it

should be noted that any event which pulls attention away
from the self, like motor activity or external distrac
tions, will reduce objective self-awareness by inducing
subjective self-awareness.
While Duval and Wicklund propose one self-focused
attentional state, objective self-awareness, Buss (1980)
proposes two self-focused attentional states:
public self-awareness.

private and

Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975)

first suggested the existence of these two states follow
ing factor analysis of the Self-Consciousness Scale.

The

private dimension is characterized by attentional focus
on the more private, covert facets of the self.

A sub

ject high on this dimension would very likely be concerned
with his or her own feelings, ideas, thoughts and moods.
The public dimension, however, is characterized by the
person seeing himself or herself as a social object from
some other person's perspective.

Fenigstein et al. note

that public self-consciousness is related to Mead's
(1934) notion of the self as defined by role taking.
In the original statement of Buss's theory, the
public-private distinction was made in terms of a dis
positional self-awareness.

More recently, the public-

private distinction has also been treated as a state
which can be manipulated (Buss & Scheier 1976; Scheier
1976; Scheier & Carver 1977, 1980; Carver & Scheier 1978;
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Wicklund 1979).

Indeed, in many of those studies (see

Scheier & Carver 1980) induced self-awareness and disposi
tional self-consciousness are used as validational cross
checks on each other.
In studies using experimentally induced private or
public self-awareness, researchers point out that the
manipulations used to induce each state are different.
Contrary to Wicklund's hypothesis (Duval & Wicklund 1972;
Wicklund 1979), mirrors, video cameras and audiences are
not seen as equivalent self-focusing stimuli by Buss.
Buss theorizes that a mirror induces a state of
private self-awareness.

This mirror-induced state is very

similar to effects produced by the trait of high private
self-consciousness (Scheier & Carver 1977; Carver &
Scheier 1978; Brockner 1979; Scheier, Buss & Buss 1978).
Scheier and Carver (1977) theorize that exposure to a
mirror heightens self-awareness just as does private selfconsciousness in the context of experimental studies.

The

camera or audience manipulation is found to produce re
sults similar to those produced by dispositional public
self-consciousness (Buss 1980), i.e., public self-aware
ness. Thus, on both theoretical and empirical grounds,
these self-awareness inductions are not seen as producing
equivalent results.

The Present Study
As should be evident at this point, anyone attempting
a demonstration of the role of salience in reports of the
sources of self-knowledge must take the discrepancy be
tween Duval, Wicklund and Buss into account.

While the.hy

pothesis of primary interest is the role of salience in
self-validation reports, a comparison of objective selfawareness and private-public self-awareness is also pos
sible in this project.

Thus, the comparison of self-

awareness claims allows the generation of a secondary hy
pothesis .
Testing of the two hypotheses was done by asking sub
jects to complete a two-part questionnaire about possible
sources of self-knowledge (Schoeneman 1981).

A manipulation

not made by Schoeneman in his original study, personal com
pared to impersonal wording, was included in this study to
see if wording of the stimulus materials has an effect on
the salience of the various sources.

The subjects in

Schoeneman1s (1981) study were given questions with a
personal warding:

"I have come to know I am a(n)_________

person from ___________ ."

The wording "I" may direct at

tention to the self, making the self more salient, result
ing in higher numbers of self-observation answers.

In

this study the question was also phrased, "People come to
know they are _____________ people from ________________."
This wording may result in a different pattern of
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self-reports by making the self less salient and social
sources more salient.
Another condition involves induction of self-awareness
states.

Subjects in this study filled out one of the two

questionnaire forms with mirror present, video camera
present, or no self-focusing stimulus present.

More spec

ifically, within the framework of Buss's theory it is pos
sible to predict an interaction between wording- and selfawareness state.
This experimental design addresses several predictions
In the control (no self-focusing stimulus present) personal
condition subjects' reports of the sources of selfknowledge were expected to replicate those of Schoeneman
(1981).

The control-impersonal condition is also expected

to replicate Schoeneman's finding, although perhaps not
as closely as will the control-personal condition.

Note

that the replication of Schoeneman's results is a neces
sary precondition for evaluation of the secondary hypothe
sis and to a lesser extent the primary hypothesis.
Evidence supporting the primary hypothesis would
be a differential pattern of reporting the sources of
self-knowledge in the mirror and TV camera groups.

More

specific predictions across these groups can only be made
within the framework of the self-awareness theories.
However,in terms of the primary hypothesis, any differen
tial reporting of the three sources would be evidence for
the salience interpretation.

\ \
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In terms of the secondary hypothesis, the results of
this study are predicted to support the predictions of
Buss (1980).

The mirror-personal condition should induce

a state of private self-awareness.

It is predicted that

these subjects will give a high (greater than 70%) mention
of self-observation as the preferred mode of self-valida
tion.

This prediction is made based on findings of

Scheier, Buss and Buss (1978) that privately self-aware
subjects make more self-attributional statements than do
other subjects.

The mirror-impersonal condition should re

sult in more self-observation reports than the control
conditions, but less self-observation reports than the
mirror-personal conditions.

The impersonal wording may

dampen the salience of the private self and hence lower
the number of mentions of self-observation.

Subjects in

the video camera condition were expected to be in a state
of public self-awareness, making causal attributions of
more public methods of self-validation more frequent.
Since publicly self-aware individuals are more sensitive
to group and social factors (Scheier 1980), feedback and
social comparison are predicted to rise substantially
over the control group figures.

Impersonal video camera

subjects should produce more reports of feedback and
social comparison than will personal video camera subjects
due to the possible self-focusing properties of the ques
tionnaire wording.
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Support for the Duval and Wicklund position would re
sult if the mirror and video camera conditions yield equiva
lent data.

However, due to the large amount of data sup

porting the public-private self-awareness distinction with
in the framework of objective self-awareness, this support
was not expected.
In summary, the hypotheses tested in this study were:
a replication of Schoeneman's 1981 study; the salience
hypothesis that reports of the sources of self-knowledge
are based on the perceptual salience of each source; and
the self-awareness hypothesis that salience effects would
vary according to Buss's 1980 self-awareness theory.

w

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Subjects
Subjects for this experiment were obtained from the
University of North Dakota's Introductory and Develop
mental Psychology subject pool.

Of the 75 subjects used

in this study, 17 were male and 55 were female and 3
failed to give this information.

The average age for all

subjects was 20.6, for males 20.4, for females 20.7.
Three subject's responses were not included in the data
analysis.

One of these subjects showed up in an apparent

state of intoxication and the other two misunderstood
the instructions and their responses were unscorable.
Three additional individuals were included in order to
have 12 subjects in each experimental condition.

Sub

jects were randomly assigned to all conditions.
Procedure and Materials
The procedure and materials are very similar to
those used and described by Schoeneman (1981).

Each sub

ject was individually presented with the materials and
procedure described below.

After being told they would

be filling out some questionnaires about the sources of
29
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self-knowledge, subjects were asked to sign a standard con
sent form.

This form simply stated they could terminate

the experiment at any time if they desired, and that their
names would not be used in reporting data.

Video camera

subjects were given a separate form which included, in
addition to the standard terms found in the consent form,
agreement to be videotaped.
All subjects were given an abbreviated 100 word
version of the Gough & Heilbrun (1965) Adjective Check
list.

This shortened version was made by using only

every third word from the checklist.

This list included

six more frequently used adjectives, attractive, confi
dent, forgetful, friendly, warm and witty, instead of
the following words which were deleted from the check
list; autocratic, conceited, formal, frivolous, weak, and
wise (Schoeneman, Note 2).
After filling out the checklist, subjects completed
an adjective selection procedure by selecting four adjec
tives corresponding to the random numbers given to them
by the experimenter and which they had indicated as being
self-descriptive.

In the instance where the random number

corresponded to a word which was not a self descriptor,
they were to use the next word which they had marked on
the checklist.

They were asked to write a short essay

either completing the sentence, "I have come to know that
I am a(n) ________________

person from ________________ VI

\\
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(personal wording) or "People come to know that they are
________________ people from _________________ " (impersonal
wording) for each of the self-descriptors.

After writing

these they used the same sentence frame and adjectives
and ranked the relative importance of the following choices
self-observation, social feedback and social comparison.
For each choice they were to assign a rating of "most
important," "second in importance," "third in importance,"
or "not applicable" (Schoeneman 1981).

Each source of self

knowledge was presented in a random position for each rank
ing.

After completion of the rankings, materials were col

lected by the author.

Subjects were then given a "de

briefing questionnaire" containing the following ques
tions:

"(1) Did the experimenter act in any way which sug

gested the kinds of answers to put down?

(2) Is there

anything about this setting or the room that suggested
the kinds of answers to put down?
ing to get at in this study?

(3) What were we try

(4) Had you discussed this

study with anyone prior to being a subject today?"

Sub

jects whose answers indicated that they may have under
stood the actual purpose of the experimental manipula
tions were briefly interviewed by the experimenter; no
subjects guessed the actual purpose of the experimental
manipulations.

Following completion of the debriefing

questionnaire, the paradigm was explained fully and sub
jects were asked to sign a "statement of experimental
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confidentiality" agreeing not to discuss theory or details
of the project with any other students for approximately
one month.
Experimental Conditions
All subjects were administered the above procedure
in one of the following conditions:

mirror, video camera

or control.
In the mirror condition, subjects were shown to a
small table with a .4m x .6m mirror on it.

The mirror

was positioned in such a way that subjects could not avoid
their reflection and still work comfortably at the table.
No explanation was given for the mirror, which had a
small tag reading "Property of psych dept.— do not move"
on it.

Several subjects asked or commented about the

mirror; they were told that the mirror belonged to the
psychology department and was to stay in the room.
In the camera condition, an Ampex model 7016007
video camera was set up so that it was trained on the
subject's face.

A video recording was made of the sub

ject, although the recordings were never viewed by any
one.

The subjects in this condition were told that some

participants in the study were being taped and the sub
ject's written consent was obtained before proceeding
with the experiment.
In the control condition, the subject worked at the
table with no mirror or camera present.
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An interrater reliability check was also performed
on the essay data.

A random sample of 48 essays were

scored by Schoeneman.

Comparison of his ratings and the

author yielded 87.5% agreement.

Both raters produced

similar percentages for each of the sources:
found 79% self-observation, 25% feedback,

the author

8% social com

parison, while Schoeneman reported 83% self-observation,
29% feedback and 8% social comparison.

Because inter

rater agreement was good, the author used his scorings for
computation of percent mention variables.
Dependent Variables
Dependent variables were identical to those used
by Schoeneman (1981).

Subjects' essays were examined by

the author and each citation of self observation, feed
back and social comparison was recorded.

A citation of a

source was defined by Schoeneman (1981) as a phrase or
sentence which indicates use of source of self knowledge.
Percent mention of any source was computed using the
following formula and example presented by Schoeneman
(1981).
Percent mentioning _ # mention of self observation
self observation
total # mentions of all sources
A similar variable was computed for social feedback and
social comparison.
Dependent variables for the ranking portion of this
experiment were simply mean rankings.

The choice of not
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applicable were computed as an additional variable for all
sources.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Overall, the results of this study replicated quite
closely the results found by Schoeneman (1981).

Across

all conditions, self-observation was mentioned most fre
quently, 71.83% of the time, followed by feedback (20.5%)
cind social comparison (7.72%).

Mean rankings were ordered

similarly; 1.58 for self observation, 1.97 for feedback,
2.33 for social comparison (note that a rank of 1 = very
best and 3 = third in importance).

Self-observation re

ceived a mean rating of not applicable 0.07 times per 4
adjective choices, feedback received 0.33 not applicable
£ind social comparison received 0.50 (see Table 3).
Table 3
Grand Means for all Variables
Self
observation

Feedback

Social
Comparison

Mean ranks3

1.58

1.97

2.33

Ratings of not
applicable

0.07

0.33

0.50

71.83

20.50

7.72

Percent mention

aNote that 1 = very best, 3 = third best.
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The percent mentions of all three sources were quite
consistent over all conditions and wordings.

Cell means

for mentions of all three sources fit into quite narrow,
nonoverlapping ranges:

self-observation from 76% to 64%,

feedback from 27% to 16% and social comparison from 11%
to 5%.

Each cell was also similarly ordered such that

means for all three sources followed the self-observation/
feedback/social comparison ordering for the number of
times cited "not applicable" and for the mean ranking.
To test the predictions made in the primary and
secondary hypotheses condition by wording ANOVA and Dun
can's Multiple Range procedure were computed on all nine
variables.

Only one significant main effect— not applic

able rating for feedback— was found.

TV camera sub

jects gave a mean of 0.58 not applicable ratings vs. 0.125
for mirror subjects.

Neither TV camera or mirror condi

tions differed from control subjects (mean = 0.292).
This pattern of results was not predicted by either
hypothesis of this study.

No significant wording main

effect or condition by wording interactions were found
(see Table 4).
Sex by wording and sex by condition analyses were
performed on all independent variables.

The only sex main

effect which reached significance was the variable per
cent mentions of social comparison.

Males reported this

source an average of 12.94% of the time while females

Table 4
Condition by Wording Cell Means for All Variables
Wording
Personal
Condition

SelfObservation

Impersonal

Feedback

Social
Comparison

1.56

1.78

2.32

0.17
76.17

0.75
19.00

1.73

SelfObservation

Feedback

Social
Comparison

1.44

1.94

2.45

0.83
4.83

0,08
63.58

0.42
27.25

0.75
9.25

1.93

2.29

1.66

2.05

2.26

0.00
72.75

0.08
20.92

0.33
6.42

0.08
75.17

0.17
16.17

0.33
8.75

1.40

2.24

2.35

1.73

1.89

2.31

0.00
74.00

0.33
20.08

0.50
5.92

0.08
69.33

0.25
19.58

0.25
11.17

Video Camera
Mean ranks
Ratings of not
applicable
Percent mentions
Mirror
Mean ranks
Ratings of not
applicable
Percent mentions
Control
Mean ranks
Ratings of not
applicable
Percent mentions
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reported it 6.13%, F(2,63) = 5.35, p < .025.

Sex by con

dition interaction was also found for this variable,
F(2,63) = 4.10, p < .025 (see Table 5).

Males reported

Table 5
Mean Percent Mention of Social Comparison for
Subjects by Experimental Condition
Subjects
Males

Condition

Females

4.17

9.00

Mirror

23.75

4.35

Control

14.28

5.52

Video camera

comparison more often in the mirror (23.75% vs. 4.35%) and
control condition (14.28 vs. 5.524) while women reported
the source more often in the TV camera condition (9.0 vs.
4.165).

However, this interaction must be interpreted

with caution since the number of males per cell was quite
low; range of 4 to 2 per cell.

No other significant main

effects or interactions were found.
To test a post-hoc theory that the experimental
groups would produce equal effects, the TV camera and
mirror conditions were combined and an ANOVA procedure
was computed testing condition, control vs. experimental,
by wording, personal vs. impersonal, for all nine vari
ables.

No significant main effects were found, however,
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there were two significant interactions; mean rank for
self-observation (F)l,68) = 4 . 45 , p < .04 and mean ranking
for feedback (F(l,68) = 4 . 51 , p < . 04 .

The directions of

these rankings were such that self-observation was ranked
lowest, and hence "better," in the experimental-impersonal
and control personal conditions (see Table 6).

Feedback

Table 6
Percent Mention Self-observation and Feedback
Means for Combined Experimental Groups
Wording
Personal
Impersonal

Condition

Combined
Experimental

Mean Ranks*3
Self-observation
Feedback

1.6
1.9

1.5
2.0

Control

Mean Ranks
Self-observation
Feedback

1.4
2.2

1.7
1.9

■9 .

•

»

Both video camera and mirror condition subjects are in
cluded in this group.

Id

Possible range of 1-3, where 1 = most important, 3 =
third in importance.

was ranked lowest in the experimental-personal and controlimpersonal conditions.

Percent of variation accounted

for in these two models was assessed using R

2

and was

found to be near zero, 0.0043% for the self-observation
variable and 0.0066% for the feedback variable.

Thus,

while these two interactions may be seen statistically as
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non-chance events, these effects do not seem to be as
powerful in terms of accounting for variance as might be
hoped.

Thus, in summary, the results of this investiga

tion quite closely replicate Schoeneman's (1981) study.
Predictions made from the salience, self-awareness and
post hoc hypothesis all failed to produce systematic,
theoretically consistent, main-effects or interactions.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Three aspects of this study's findings are consid
ered below.

The first deals with the aspects of this in

vestigation which served as a replication of Schoeneman's
(1981) research.

The second part considers data relevant

to the salience hypothesis both in terms of the results of
this study and implications for future research.

The

last area of discussion concerns results relevant to the
predictions made by the self-awareness theories of Buss,
Duval and Wicklund.
Replication of Schoeneman's Sources of Self-Knowledge Study
The main finding in this investigation is a replica
tion of Schoeneman's (1981) study.

The overall percent

mentions of 72/21/8, for self observation/feedback/social
comparison are quite similar to Schoeneman's results of
70/19/11 in a questionnaire study and 72/20/9 with an in
terview procedure.

Other variables, ratings of not ap

plicable and mean ranking are also nearly equal in both
this and Schoeneman's study.

Additionally the sex dif

ference reported in this study, 14% vs. 9% mentions of
social comparison for males vs. females, is very close
41
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to Schoeneman's finding of a sex difference of 14% vs. 8%
(males vs. females) for this same variable in his ques
tionnaire study.

This replication of Schoeneman's results,

using subjects from a primarily rural midwestern area con
trasted to his use of urbanized eastern subjects, under
scores the robustness of the phenomena involved in report
ing the sources of self-knowledge.
It is especially interesting that in each of these
two diverse populations, men mention social comparison
1-1/2 to 2 times more often than women.

This sex differ

ence was not discussed at length by Schoeneman (1981),
possibly because of the uncertain reliability of an ef
fect found in one of his two investigations.

The replica

tion of this result, however, merits increased attention.
The finding that men report social comparison as a
source of self-knowledge more often than women is, in
some ways, surprising.

Broverman, Vogel, Broverman,

Clarkson and Rosenkrantz (1972) and Rosenkrantz, Vogel,
Bee, Broverman and Broverman (1968) investigated traits
which serve as sex-role stereotypes and found that men are
usually seen, among other things, as independent, domi
nant, and self-confident, while women are usually seen
as possessing fewer of these traits.

These descriptors

of men as being independent and self-confident do not seem
to fit in with the finding that men reported more social
comparison, which is characterized by dependence on others.
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The work of Deaux with sex differences in attributional processes may provide an explanation of this dif
ference.

Deaux (1976) reports that men typically have

higher expectations of their own competence than women
do of theirs and that men more often claim skill as a
causal factor while women frequently cite luck or chance
or an easier task as being responsible for their suc
cesses.

Given these findings, it is not surprising that

Deaux reports that the male sex-role is correlated much
higher with self esteem than is the female sex-role.
Thus, it would seem that men have more of a vested inter
est in knowing their performance relative to peers and
others since self esteem is based on their perceived
skill and competency.

Possibly men feel more of a need

for normative comparison to support their self-esteem
needs and as a result report social comparison more fre
quently.
One possible method of investigating this self
esteem hypothesis would involve manipulations of self
esteem (Morse & Gergen 1970).

Exposure to someone with

highly desirable characteristics was found by Morse and
Gergen to lower self-esteem, while exposure to someone
with undesirable traits had the opposite effect.

If the

self esteem hypothesis is correct, then for males com
pleting a sources of self-knowledge questionnaire in the
former condition social comparison mentions may be higher
than in the latter condition.

The Morse and Gergen (1970)
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investigation used only male subjects so predictions for
females in these conditions would be more difficult-

If

self esteem does account for this sex difference, then a
Morse and Gergen-like manipulation with women subjects
might have little effect since the self-esteem/sex role
relationship is weak, producing little desire for norma
tive comparison.
Other explanations of this effect are possible, i.e.,
exposure to social psychological information about sex
roles may be causing a reactive, or corrective, effect in
the self-presenting strategies of men or women if they
perceive the sex roles to be undesirable.

However, this

latter argument seems less convincing, and more difficult
to examine empirically than the self-esteem hypothesis.
It also should be noted that this sex difference might
possibly be an artifact of the questionnaire since both
investigations which have found this difference have used
the same method.
The finding of a sex by conditioning interaction
must be interpreted with caution, since the mean number of
males per cell was less than 3 with a range from 2 to 4.
Thus, no reliable conclusions may be drawn from this in
teraction, and hence no discussion of it will be offered
except to note that replication is the only method avail
able to ascertain the reliability and therefore the
validity of this effect.
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This discussion of this investigation has, so far,
been emphasizing the replication of Schoeneman's original
study.

Since the present study did meet the criteria of

replication it is now possible to examine the experimental
predictions made in the salience (primary) hypothesis and
the self-awareness (secondary) hypothesis.
The Salience Hypothesis
Briefly restated, the salience hypothesis predicted
that the mirror and TV camera conditions would differ from
the control condition in the types of sources of selfknowledge emphasized.

The results predicted were higher

citations of self-observation in the mirror condition
and higher feedback and social comparison in the TV camera
condition.

This did not occur.

Indeed, as mentioned in

Chapter IV, the percent mention variables fell into neat,
non-overlapping ranges such that each cell was a close
replication of Schoeneman's (1981) study.
The condition by wording analysis of variance pro
cedures indicated no significant wording or interaction
effects and a condition main-effect for only the number of
rankings of not applicable (NA) for feedback.

Based on

this pattern of results, there is little support for the
salience hypothesis.

The only significant finding is, in

fact, in the opposite direction than a salience hypothesis
would predict:

TV subjects mean NA ratings = .6, mirror

subjects mean NA rating = .1.
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One possible explanation for the lack of support
for the salience hypothesis may be that the self-awareness
manipulations failed to have the intended effect.

However,

in light of the considerable empirical evidence that Buss
(1980) cites concerning public and private self-awareness
inductions, it seems unlikely that the TV camera and
mirror failed as induction techniques.

Subjects in the

TV camera condition signed a video-tape consent form and
always worked in the presence of an operating video-tape
recorder.

There is no reason to suspect that subjects did

not believe they were being taped which would have re
duced the validity or magnitude of the effect.

Indeed,

when debriefing each subject, most of them expressed re
lief that the videotape would not, in fact, be viewed.
Similarly, there is little reason to be suspect of the
effect of the mirror condition.

It is unlikely that this

condition was confounded by other effects, such as think
ing the mirror was a one-way observation mirror (which
would have induced public self-awareness) since the mirror
was leaning with an open space between the bottom of the
mirror and the wall.
Even though at this time there is little or no
reason to suspect the validity of these self-awareness
manipulations, the salience hypothesis could be re-tested
by using dispositional self-consciousness.

Instead of

depending on manipulations alone to induce transient
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states of self-awareness, the self-consciousness scale
(Buss 1980; Feningsten, Scheier & Buss 1975) could be used
to select subjects high in dispositional public or private
self-consciousness.

These subjects could then be exposed to

the relevant conditions— high private self consciousness
people in the mirror condition and high public selfconscious people in the TV camera condition— and the pre
dictions from the investigation could be re-examined.

It

is important to note that dispositional traits alone prob
ably would not be sufficient to produce the desired ef
fects.

Buss (1980) notes that public self-consciousness

must be, in effect, turned on by some induction techniques
like a video recorder's presence.
An alternative hypothesis to explain this investiga
tion's results deals not with lack of induction effects,
but with questionnaire effects.

That is to say is the

experimental task of reporting about the sources of selfknowledge is such an overwhelming salience or perceptual
focusing manipulation that it directly affects the kinds
of answers (sources) given by subjects.
In this regard, Buss (1980) makes several statements
which initially appear quite confusing.

Discussing the

role of self-report questionnaires and interviews he
states, "in both interviews and questionnaires, the dis
tractions away from the self are sufficient to prevent
any significant private self-awareness"

(Buss 1980, p. 18).
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This seems to raise a question of the validity, or even the
possibility, of examining self-reports completed while
attempting to induce a state of private self-awareness.
Apparently though, self-reports and private self-awareness
are not mutually exclusive as he later notes, "a mirror's
presence during self-report evidently does enhance accur
acy of self-report.

The effect is probably caused by pri

vate self-awareness; public self-awareness has no impact"
(Buss 1980, p. 68).

Careful examination of these state

ments indicates a unique relationship between question
naires and self-awareness.

Evidently questionnaires in

and of themselves do not induce private self-awareness.
Hence, it is unlikely that the fact that the task was a
questionnaire in and of itself induced private selfawareness, regardless of experimental condition (Davis &
Brock 1975; Liebling 1975; Buss & Scheier 1976).

However,

questionnaire content may still have altered the subject's
self-awareness state.
In discussing the limitations of self-awareness
theory, Buss (1980) raises the issue that some experimental
tasks fail to induce either private or public selfawareness.

When the self is referred to with pronouns

such as "I" or "me", Buss (1980) claims that differenti
ating between public and private aspects of the self is
impossible.

Thus, in situations where an individual must

make use of non-specific or generalized self-attributions,
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self-awareness theory may not be appropriate; these situa
tions result in a self-focus called the undifferentiated
self.

Schoeneman's (1981) questionnaire may be having

exactly the effect discussed above.

When answering the

questions about the sources of self-knowledge, the set of
possible answers includes both self-reliant and socially
reliant methods.

Thus, the very nature of the answers

to the questionnaire may produce a generalized non
specific self-focus.

Thinking about self-observation may

lead to a private self-awareness-like state, thinking
about feedback and social comparison may lead to a public
self-awareness-like state, but having to be aware of both
would allow for only the generalized self-focus.

If this

is the case, then inductions to produce private or public
self-awareness become confounded by the generalized self
focus produced by the questionnaire.

In the case of un

differentiated self-focus, Buss (1980) predicts that both
public and private self-awareness states would increase
self-attributions of causality.

In the present experiment

this would lead to the predictions that if the private
and public self-awareness manipulations were effective
then both mirror and video condition can be viewed as one
experimental group which would produce more citations of
self-observation.
This post-hoc hypothesis was statistically examined
using ANOVA procedures described in Chapter IV.

The

reader will recall that no main effects were found to be
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significant but two interactions were significant (see
Table 6).

Self-observation was ranked as better in the ex

perimental-impersonal and control personal conditions
while feedback was ranked as better in experimentalpersonal and control-impersonal conditions.
These results are, once again, quite surprising in
several ways.

The post hoc predictions were not supported

since a main effect with self observation being chosen
more often in the experimental group was not found.

Again,

evidence does not seem to support the hypothesis of differ
ing citations of the sources of self-knowledge as a result
of self-awareness inductions even when controlling for
the possible effects of the questionnaire blurring the
specific, i.e., public or private, induced state.
The interactions are quite puzzling and it is dif
ficult to know how best to interpret them.

While they seem

to be significant, or non-chance, events at the .05 alpha
level, they also account for almost none of the variance.
This leads to an interpretation of them as non-chance
events, but relatively unimportant events as well.
Some of the issues raised by this post-hoc analy
sis may prove useful in doing further investigations of
the sources of self-knowledge.

It was earlier proposed

that this line of research could be approached using trait
self-consciousness plus state self-awareness.

However, in

light of the possible questionnaire effects, differing
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predictions might be made.

High private self-conscious

and high public self-conscious might produce identical
results of higher citations of self-observation.

This

would be the pattern of results which would most likely
occur since in thinking about the ways of self-validation
the public-private distinction becomes blurred.
It seems that this undifferentiated self-focus is
likely to occur as long as the set of possible answers
includes both social and private methods.

To alter this

self-focus confound it would seem not so important to
change the actual questions but to change, in some way,
the type of response given by subjects.
ficult, if not impossible, task to do.

This is a dif
Responding to

questions about the sources of self-knowledge seems to
ultimately involve awareness of the different sources and
hence a potential confound.

Therefore, it seems that try

ing to reduce the self-focus confound is an unlikely
avenue to take in investigating this phenomenon.
In this section, several alternative methods have
been proposed to test the salience hypothesis.

Nonethe

less, the evidence from this investigation provides very
little support for a salience-perceptual focusing account
for reports of self-knowledge.

It is therefore appropri

ate to consider alternative explanations for this
phenomena, the most promising of which is the self
presentation bias suggested by Schoeneman (1981).

In
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this explanation, reports of the sources of self-knowledge
were thought to be a function of the perceived desir
ability or goodness of each source.

He suggested that sub

jects may have implicit notions that self-observation is,
in some way, a good source while feedback and social com
parison are less good.
Schoeneman (1981) tested the self-presentation bias
by asking subjects to report the best source of selfknowledge in each of the following conditions, to appear
in the best light, to appear in the worst light, answer as
most college students would, and answer as honestly and
truthfully as possible.
quite interesting:

The results of

his study are

he found that best light (51/35/14 for

percent mention of self-observation/feedback/social com
parison) and most truthful (52/39/9), were quite similar
and that worst light (24/25/51) and other students (21/34/
40), were also more nearly identical.

In

his study,

self-observation and social comparison varied the most
while feedback remained relatively stable throughout all
four imagined conditions.

This indicates some support

for this alternative explanation.
It is curious, though, that subjects seem to evalu
ate self-observation so positively and social comparison so
poorly while feedback remains unchanged.

Schoeneman (1981)

suggests that self-observation and social comparison may
vary more since these sources require effort and an

53
intentionally initiated process of self-evaluation while
feedback does not necessarily require an active role.
Thus, subjective effort

may be important since it tells

observers that the self-validator wants to know something
about himself.

The way someone goes about doing this, by

self-observation or social comparison, may then become
important.

Someone who can tell by self-observing may

be seen as more in touch with themselves and hence, pos
sibly, as more healthy.

Conversely, someone who must rely

on comparing themselves to others may seem less healthy.
Schoeneman (1981) suggests that comparison may be seen
as implying uncertainty or other unfavorable dispositions.
It is possible that this implicit uncertainty may be
interpreted by. observers as being representative of an
underlying neurotic-like disposition.
The self-presentation hypothesis is also a testable
one.

One investigation of this hypothesis,

man (1981) has already been discussed.

by Schoene

An alternative

method of testing this theory would be to reverse the
procedure used by Schoeneman.

Instead of asking subjects

to respond in best, worst or to meet other criteria, have
them rate someone's competency, likeability or mental
health after having been exposed to a description of
them learning about themselves through the various
sources.

Someone who 'relies on social comparison might

be seen as less competent or healthy than someone who
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utilizes self-observation.

Feedback could be divided into

two classes, solicited and unsolicited, and it would be
expected that the former would be rated as less desirable,
or healthy, than the latter.

It is important to note

that in this snap-judgment paradigm (Schneider, Hastorf
& Ellsworth 1979) and Schoeneman's (1981) self-presentation
bias investigation the underlying causal factor might
still be a cognitive-perceptual bias.

Even though sub

jects seem to be concerned with self-presentation, it
could be assumed that

they are doing this because of an

illusory correlation (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Chapman &
Chapman 1967, 1969) between desirability or healthiness
and the sources of self-knowledge.
The Self-Awareness Hypothesis
Of all predictions made in the course of this inves
tigation, the self-awareness hypothesis are the most diffi
cult to evaluate.

It should be recalled that this set

of predictions could be evaluated only if systematic
salience effects were found.

In the absence of any sali

ence produced differences, the self-awareness hypotheses
became untestable; it can not be determined if salience
induced differences varied according to Buss or Duval
and Wicklund when there were little or no differences in
the first place.
In the previous section, reasons for the lack of
salience effects were discussed at length.

These remarks
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will not be repeated here except to note that the hypothe
sis that questionnaire effects blurred self-awareness into
an undifferentiated state has implications for the selfawareness hypothesis as well.

These effects would seem

to have the effect of taking the present investigation
beyond the scope of self-awareness theory.

Thus, in hind

sight (see Fischhoff 1975 for an interesting experimental
analysis of hindsight phenomena) it may be that the BussDuval and Wicklund self-awareness distinction was untestable from the outset.
General Discussion and Summary
So far, the discussion of various portions of this
investigation has been done without seeking to integrate
the results.

In this section, this integration will be

attempted as well as implications for future research.
The most important result from this project has
been a replication of self-observation as the method sub
jects report preferring to learn about the self (Schoeneman 1981; Schoeneman, Tabor and Nash, Note 1).

This

robustness is indicated since geographically and demographically different populations produced near-identical
results.

Most surprising was the confirmation of a sex

difference for mentions of social comparison as reported
by Schoeneman (1981).

Theoretical explanations for this

were offered in terms of sex-role expectations and self
esteem.

These predictions were stated in a manner which

56
is empirically testable to determine the validity of the
hypothesis.
The primary, or salience, hypothesis was not sup
ported well by the results of this project.

One possible

explanation for this was that self-awareness inductions
were weak.

It was suggested that an alternative approach

to test the salience hypothesis is to use subjects high
in dispositional self-consciousness and expose them to
self-awareness inductions.

The post-hoc analysis of the

hypothesis that the inductions were producing an undif
ferentiated self-focus was also not supported.

Two un

usual interactions were found which were theoretically un
explainable.

These interactions were found to account for

a small percentage of the total variance which reduced
their importance substantially.

The possibility of a

generalized self-focus, created by the questionnaire, was
also discussed in terms of future research as a potential
confound with self-awareness.

Indeed, other investiga

tions into the salience hypothesis might wish to consider
public and private self-consciousness and awareness as
experimentally equal.
While at this time the salience hypothesis has not
been completely evaluated, an alternative explanation,
first offered by Schoeneman (1981) was discussed.

It

is quite possible that a self-presentation bias is caused
by a cognitive bias in which subjects infer a pattern

57
of illusory correlated pathology with the sources of selfknowledge.

This is also a testable proposition and a

method for examining it was included above.
Evaluation of the self-awareness hypothesis using
predictions from the theories of Buss and Duval and Wicklund was not possible in this project.

If the questionnaire

did result in a non-specific self-focus, which is not known
at the present time, this issue may have been unanswerable
from the beginning.
As with many projects, this one seems to have created
as many new questions as it gave answers to old ones.
Future research is the only method available to examine
the hypothesized role of self esteem in the social compari
son sex difference, the somewhat uncertain possibility of
a salience effect in reporting about self-knowledge and to
examine the hypothesis of a cognitively based self
presentation bias.
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